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In Dialogue with Augustine 
Augustine’s work, in addition to having its own identity, continues to be a 
mirror by which different eras, cultures and visions of the world can gauge their 
relationship with tradition. Hermeneutically speaking, this is particularly true of civ. 
Dei: because of its thematic complexity and the set of explanations woven through 
it, this work is not only open to a plurality of interpretations, but, throughout history, 
has also served as a lens through which the different manifestations of the 
relationship between Christian faith and philosophical inquiry can be viewed. 
Drawing upon the title of an excellent work by Ettienne Gilson, contemporary 
culture continues to question itself regarding the Métamorphoses de la cité de 
Dieu. In this fruitful hermeneutical circularity, however, the interpreter of Au-
gustine must not project upon his work the tendency, particularly widespread 
today, toward selective and reductive reading that leads one to read civ. Dei like 
the centones. This is important for several reasons, not the least of which is the 
fact that Augustine did not intend to have his work classified this way.1 On the 
other hand, the search for thematic coherence and unity of inspiration, which is 
the legitimate concern of the best Augustinian historiography, can help us better 
evaluate contemporary culture’s reticence toward Augustine’s answers and, even 
prior to that, his questions. 
1. Cf. civ. Dei XVII,15 (CCSL 48, p. 579). 
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An aspect of this comparison that is particularly relevant today concerns the 
relationship between polytheism and idolatry. Contemporary culture is 
permeated with a renewed openness to polytheism. The manifesto that 
legitimizes this tendency can be found in the famous words of Nietzsche: 
For an individual to posit his own ideal and to derive from it his own law, joys 
and rights—that may well have been considered hitherto to be the most 
outrageous of human aberrations and idolatry itself. . . . The wonderful art and 
power of creating gods—polytheism—was that through which this drive could 
discharge itself, purify, perfect and ennoble itself. . . . Monotheism, in contrast, 
this rigid consequence of the teachings of a normal human type—that is, the belief 
in a normal god next to whom there are only false pseudo-gods—was perhaps the 
greatest danger to humanity so far.2 
In  another  work,  Nietzsche’s  Zarathustra imagines that the gods one day 
“laughed themselves to death! This happened when the most godless words 
issued from a God himself—the words: ‘There is one God! Thou shalt have no 
other God beside me!’”3 
Among the many texts that could be quoted alongside Nietzsche’s, suffice it 
to recall the words of Cioran: 
Le polythéisme correspond mieux à la diversité de nos tendances et de nos 
impulsions, auxquelles il offre la possibilité de s’exercer, de se manifester, cha-
cune d’elles étant libre de tender, selon sa nature, vers le dieu qui lui convient 
sur le moment. Mais qu’entreprendre avec un seul dieu? comment l’envisager, 
comment l’utiliser? Lui present, on vit toujours sous pression. Le monothéisme 
comprime notre sensibilité: il nous apporofndit en nous resserrant. . . . Nous 
étions assurément plus normaux avec plusieurs dieux que nous ne le sommes 
avec un seul.4 
Commenting on this rehabilitation, David Miller wrote: 
We have suffered a death of God. But, now that the first shadows of desperation 
have passed, we discover a new opportunity coming from the loss of a single center 
that held everything together. The death of God was in effect the death of a mono-
theistic way of thinking and speaking of God and, in general, of a monotheistic way 
of thinking and speaking of meaning and of the general human being.5 
2. F. Nietzsche, The Greatest Advantage of Polytheism, in The Gay Science, trans. B. Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 128–129. 
3. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. G. Parkes (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), p. 158. 
4. E. M. Cioran, Le mauvais démiurge (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), pp. 35–36. 
5. D. Miller, The New Polytheism. The Rebirth of the Gods and the Goddesses (Dallas, TX: Spring 
Publications, 1981), p. 25. 
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Although the connection he made is questionable, Miller went on to denounce 
the political consequences of these different religious forms: “Socially understood, 
polytheism is eternally in unresolvable conflict with social monotheism, which in its 
worst form is fascism and in its less destructive forms is imperialism, capitalism, 
feudalism  and  monarchy.”  His  conclusion,  which  equates  religion  with  politics, 
would certainly be problematic for the principle of the laity or the common people: 
“There  is  an  incipient polytheism always lurking in democracy. This polytheism 
will surface during the history of democracies if the civilization does not first suc-
cumb to anarchy.”6 
This brief study will not permit a broader exploration of this unexpected and 
paradoxical twist in contemporary thought, a twist that has allowed for a 
simultaneous convergence of different themes and motifs on the psychological, 
anthropological, social and political levels.7 The root of this phenomenon lies in the 
crisis of reason, which appears today as the only possible alternative to modern 
rationalism, the culture that a widespread stereotype tends to define as 
“postmodern.” The difficulty of articulating the relationship between the many and 
the one and of measuring oneself critically against the metaphysical difference 
between finite and infinite, a move which was one of the greatest achievements of 
the Greek logos, tends to obviate a difference in altitude with the sheer heights of 
transcendence and permits the postmodern individual to foster the illusion that he 
can  reproduce  it  on  an  “all  too  human”  level  in  the  paradoxical  form of  an  idol. 
According to Marion, because the adorer fears atheism in the sense of being 
abandoned by the gods, any idol that is taken seriously attempts to adapt him or her 
to the divine. In this way, the idol loses the distance that identifies the divine as 
such—as that which does not belong to us, but comes toward us.”8 
This contribution seeks to listen in on a critical interlocution between Augustine 
and contemporary thought regarding this phenomenon by re-reading, according to an 
inner coherence, the first and second parts of civ. Dei. The fundamental intent of this 
re-reading can be explained via three theses. The first calls upon the anthropological 
pertinence of faith: unlike atheism, which can be considered a conspicuous variable of 
modern culture but historically limited and rather elitist, the true alternative that is 
continually proposed to us by the Scriptures, the Fathers and by Augustine in 
particular, is not between believing and not believing, but between faith and idolatry. 
After all, the opposite of faith isn’t incredulity; it is idolatry. For this reason, we 
6. Ibid., p. 26. 
7. In fact, I have attempted just such an interpretation in my Cielo di plastica. L’eclisse 
dell’infinito nell’epoca delle idolatrie (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 2009). 
8. Cf. J.-L. Marion, L’idole et la distance: cinq études (Paris: B. Grasset, 1977), pp. 18–19. 
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could agree with Scheler that “Jeder endliche Geist glaubt entweder an Gott oder 
an einen Götzen.”9 Another way of expressing the radicalism of this “either/or” 
is to employ the Augustinian opposition of heaven and earth, which, of course, 
provides the criterion for distinguishing between the two cities. 
The second thesis, while clearly connected with the first, concerns the dif-
ference—and therefore the absolute incompatibility—between monotheism and 
polytheism. This difference makes it impossible to identify the latter as more 
inclusive, as if monotheism were an impoverished and intolerant form of religious 
faith. Instead, in the era of multiculturalism, it seems that religions can only be 
liberated from the temptation to fundamentalism if they are willing to enter into the 
pantheon of compatible cults. Hidden behind this drift toward polytheism, which has 
infiltrated contemporary culture so widely and thoroughly, however, is an idolatrous 
compulsion which in our day—not unlike it did in Augustine’s—has come to play an 
important role in the Weltanschauung of the civitas terrena. 
The third and final thesis concerns the ethical and political implications of 
this difference: according to Augustine, faith in one, transcendent God is an 
alternative not only to idolatrous faiths, but also to all forms of violence in 
interpersonal relationships. It is simply not true that a monotheistic faith is an 
obstacle to all forms of peaceful coexistence, or that, in the name of a single 
system of thought, monotheism introduces rigidity and intolerance into the 
political sphere. According to Augustine, the opposite is closer to reality: it is the 
civitas terrena, which draws its gods from the earth, that seeks an equivocal 
sacralization and, in this way, infects the fabric of coexistence with the 
destabilizing and nihilistic virus that is inherently deceitful and violent. 
De vera et falsa religione 
My approach to civ. Dei draws upon the thesis of Goulven Madec.10 According to 
Madec, civ. Dei can be read as a work de vera et falsa religione, in the sense that it 
foregrounds an irreducible competition between Christian religion and pagan cults 
with regard to the full attainment of happiness and demystifies all the false promises 
9. M. Scheler, loom Ewigen im Menschen, in Scheler Gesammelte Werke, vol. 5, ed. Maria Scheler 
(Bern: Frank Verlag, 1954, 19685), p. 261. 
10. Cf. G. Madec, “Le De civitate Dei comme De vera religione,” in Interiorità e intenzionalità nel 
“De civitate Dei” di Sant’Agostino, ed. R. Piccolomini (Roma: Institutum Patristicum “Augus-
tinianum,” 1991), pp. 7–33. This essay is now available in Petites études augustiniennes (Paris: 
Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1994), pp. 189–213. Madec’s view is shared by I. Bochet. See 
her Introduction á Saint Augustin, La cité de Dieu,  I  (Paris:  Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 
1993), pp. 11ff. 
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of polytheism.11 Obviously, this approach necessitates a careful re-reading of the 
first part of the work, books that are too often ignored on the assumption that 
they seem dated or of little contemporary relevance. In this vein, I will start by 
establishing an intrinsic link between the first and the second parts of civ. Dei. 
In the first ten books of civ. Dei, Augustine opens a polemical front directly 
against pagan culture, which seems to have been impacted by the other comparisons 
and conflicts that marked his reflective journey toward maturity. Scholars have 
rightly indicated the impact of the Pelagian dispute on the composition of this 
work,12 as well as that with the Donatists. More complex is the relationship with 
Manichaeism, which has fueled inaccurate interpretations of the antithesis between 
the two cities. The intellectual, religious and human experience of Augustine as a 
member of the Manichaean sect left a profound mark on the foundational categories 
of civ. Dei. This mark, however, was not in the form of a more or less latent dualism. 
On the contrary, it was precisely his critical victory over Manichaean dualism that 
helped Augustine internalize the conflict between good and evil and to avoid 
hypostasizing it on the cosmic and ontological level. As is well known, the two cities 
are not on the same plane: just as there are not two natures, but a nature and the 
corruptio of the voluntas, there is also one unique city that triumphs eternally and its 
historical defectio, which distances itself from the former through the perversion of 
its loves. Just as there was only one city at the beginning of time, so also will there be 
just  one  at  the  eschaton:  “The  earthly  city will not be everlasting; for when it is 
condemned to the final punishment it will no longer be a city.”13 
In grappling with the doctrine of Mani, Augustine comes out with a strengthened 
monotheistic faith; in fact, it increases simultaneously with the assertion  of  God’s 
absolute  immutability:  “He  in  fact  is  perfect,  lacking  nothing,  has  no  origin,  is  not 
divided, has no extension, is entirely gathered in himself, immutable, self-sufficient, 
happy in himself, because of the abundance of his goodness he spoke through his Word 
and  all  was  made.  He  commanded  and  everything  was  created.”14 However, the 
discovery of the aggressive, and not just defective, character of an evil act distances 
11. The fundamental work here is G. Bolis, L’idolatria in S. Agostino. Una prospettiva 
antropologica (Milano: Pontificio Seminario Lombardo, Roma: Glossa, 2004). 
12. Cf. R. Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
13. Civ. Dei XV,4; For this trans., see H. Bettenson, Saint Augustine Concerning the City of God 
against the Pagans (London:  Penguin Books,  1972),  p.  599. Cf. CCSL  48,  p.  456:  “Terrena 
porro civitas, quae sempiterna non erit (neque enim, cum extremo supplicio damnata fuerit, iam 
civitas erit), hic habet bonum suum.” 
14. C . Faust. 14,11 (CSEL 25, p. 412): “Ille enim perfectus et nullius indigens et nusquam defluens 
neque discissus neque per loca distentus apud se totus incommutabilis sibi que sufficiens, se ipso 
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him—at least on this point—from Neo-Platonic thought. It induces him to 
conceive of polytheism not only as a simple distortion of true religion thanks 
merely to its intellectual deficiencies, but also as the result of a diabolic deception. 
The modern reader should not be surprised by the great amounts of space and 
ink that are devoted to demonology in civ. Dei.15 In the Greek world, the daimon 
originally indicated an unforeseeable non-human event present in phenomena.16 
It was thus conceived as a supernatural force and was understood in the vague 
and generic sense of theós and, like the latter, was endowed with the privilege of 
immortality (athánatos). Although it began among the faith of the common 
people, demonology progressively affirmed itself in the Orphic religion and even 
came to exercise significance influence on Plato, who acknowledged that 
daimones mediated between the divine and human spheres.17 A particularly de-
veloped  demonology  is  present  in  the  doctrines  of  the  “Platonists,”  which,  in 
turn, have various aspects in common with the Chaldean Oracles, especially 
Albinus, Apuleius, and Plutarch.18 
In the years immediately preceding the composition of civ. Dei,  Augustine’s 
attention to demonology increased: on the one hand, he defended Christian faith 
against any and all polytheistic contaminations, attributing to Christology an un-
equivocal discontinuity from any other form of mediation between the divine and 
the human; and, on the other, he increasingly equated polytheism with idolatry. For 
example, in cons. ev., which was probably composed just after c. Faust., he af-
firmed that, with the coming of Christ, people came to Him as he made the words of 
the prophets his own over against the people’s idolatry and as he cast down their 
beatus propter abundantiam bonitatis per uerbum suum dixit et facta sunt; mandauit, et creata 
sunt.” This trans. is my own. 
15. Cf. Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society, p. 44 (cf. n. 12). 
16. Cf. A. D. Nock, Conversion: the old and the new in religion from Alexander the Great to 
Augustine of Hippo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
17. According to Plato “the universe being thus full throughout of living creatures,” the demons “act as 
interpreters, and interpreters of all things, to one another and to highest gods, seeing that the middle 
ranks  of  creatures  can  flit  so  lightly  over  the  hearth  and  the whole  universe.”Epinom., 985b, in 
Plato, Philebus and Epinomis, trans. A. E. Taylor (London: Th. Nelson and Sons, 1956), p. 239. 
On the mediating function of demons, see also Maximus of Tyre, Diss., 14,6–8, Bibliotheca 
Teubneriana, ed. M. B. Trapp (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1994) pp. 122–125; Plutarch, De def. orac., 
415a and 416 d–f, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, ed. W. Sieveking (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1997), pp. 70 
and 74–75; Celsus in Origen, Contra Cels., 8,63 (cf. PG 21, cols. 1609–1612). 
18. At 15,2 of his Didaskalikos, Albinus presents the demons as generated gods who preside over 
many and  various  evil  practices:  “From  them  derives  omens,  oracles,  dreams,  and  all  other 
things  practiced  by  man  concerning  divination.”  See  Albinus,  Il Didaskalikos di Albino e il 
medioplatonismo, II, ed. G. Invernizzi (Roma: Abete, 1976), p. 38. 
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simulacra.19 All were aware that condemnation of idolatry is ubiquitous in the Old 
Testament, but now, through the work of Christ and His Church, the Author of that 
promise is proclaimed as the God of all the earth.20 Augustine takes advantage of 
this opportunity to condemn the hypothesis, advanced mira dementia, that Christ 
adored pagan gods and worked miracles through their intercession.21 
Augustine faces the issue explicitly in divin. daem. (406–411). In this work he 
resolves the quaestio about the divinatory power of demons at its root and in full 
continuity with Jewish tradition, which understood demons as agents of evil, as 
minions of Satan who were formed during the rebellion against God.22 Ep. 102 to 
Deogratias, which dates from this same period, is of particular importance in this 
regard since it confirms the irreducibly anti-idolatrous nature of the Christian 
religion: the difference between angels and demons is not purely nominal because 
angels approve only the sacrifice offered to the one true God.23 With the psalmist, 
Augustine repeats: Quondam omnes dii gentium daemonia (cf. Ps. 95:5);24 Christian 
religion does not reproach the sacrifices of pagans in se, but only their disordered 
destinations. Thus, in polytheism, one can recognize the reflection of a disorder that 
was originally produced in a sphere superior to the human one. 
In fact, dii falsi, hoc est daemones, qui sunt praevaricatores angeli, never would 
have asked for sacrifices for themselves, knowing that sacrifices are due to the one 
true God; it is precisely this point that comprises the discriminating factor between 
vera religio and noxia superstitio.25 And it corresponds to the antithesis between pia 
humilitas and impia superbia, sive hominum, sive daemonum,26 which 
19. Cf. cons. ev. I,26,41 (CSEL 43, p. 40). 
20. Cf.  ibid.,  I,32,50 (CSEL 43, p. 54): “Ipse Deus universae  terrae, sicut tanto ante promisit, per 
Christum et Christi Ecclesiam iam vocatur.” 
21. Cf. G. Madec, “Le Christ des païens d’après le De consenso evangelistarum de saint Augustin,” 
in Recherches Augustiniennes 26 (1992): pp. 48–67. Cf. also Dodaro, Christ and the Just 
Society, 95 (cf. n. 12). 
22. Cf.  L.  Alici,  “Introduzione,”  in  Sant’Agostino,  La vera religione, NBA VI/2 (Roma: Città 
Nuova, 1995), pp. 635–636. 
23. Ep.102,20 (CSEL 34/2, p. 562). 
24. Ibid., 19 (CSEL 34/2, p. 561). 
25. Ibid., 18 (CSEL 34/2, p. 559): “Hoc sane nec in ista brevitate praetereundum est, quod templum, 
sacerdotium, sacrificium, et alia quaecumque ad haec pertinentia, nisi uni vero Deo deberi nos-
sent dii falsi, hoc est daemones, qui sunt praevaricatores angeli, numquam haec sibi a cultoribus 
suis, quos decipiunt, expetissent. Verum haec cum exhibentur Deo, secundum eius 
inspirationem atque doctrinam, vera religio est: cum autem daemonibus, secundum eorum 
impiam superbiam, noxia superstitio.” 
26. Cf. ibid., 20. 
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is the fundamental hermeneutical key for civ. Dei. The epistemological primacy 
of monotheism is matched by the primacy of true religion over idolatry. In its 
most radical form, it is exemplified by the diabolical perversion of the angels and 
by the original transgression: sin is essentially an act of wickedness carried out 
before God.27 Moreover, it is carried out against God; it is a daring act of open 
rebellion, an attempt to negate the difference between finite and infinite. In this 
way it repeatedly reveals the impotence of the creature’s place in the ontological 
order, a place which is “the disposition of equal and unequal realities, each to its 
own place.”28 
This revolt is destined not only to fail, but also to rebound in a self-destructive 
way against its author(s).29 Being unable to overturn the order of being, the very act 
of attempting to overturn it provokes the fall of the sinner. In fact, evil is not that 
toward which one falls, but the act of falling itself.30 Herein lies its nihilistic root: 
not only in the Neo-Platonic sense of the maximum distance from the good, but in 
both the Manichaean sense of a self-destructive conflict and, if anything, even more 
obviously in the biblical sense of an egotistical pathology of love that generates 
division and unhappiness. At the same time, there is a fundamental difference with 
Manichaeism: the antithesis between good and evil is, in this case, not the reflection 
of an antithesis between being and nothingness. There is a fundamental asymmetry 
between ontological good and moral good: in the order of creation there is no 
alternative to being,31 while the will of the rational creature is constantly exposed to 
an ethical alternative between good and evil, an alternative which, in a post-
lapsarian universe, can no longer be faced with lucidity and equidistance. As Marion 
has noted “telle est en effet la loi de l’idolatrie: je deviens toujours ce que je vise et 
possède; si donc je vise moins que Dieu, je deviendrai moins que Dieu, je deviendrai 
moins que lui, donc moins que moi.”32 At this point, Pascal also comes 
27. A fact also noted by S. Kierkegaard; see his La malattia mortale, in Opere (Firenze: Sansoni 
1972), pp. 666–667. Cf. also P. Ricoeur, F initude et culpabilité. II. La symbolique du mal (Paris: 
Aubier,  1960),  p.  54:  “La  catégorie  qui  commande  la  notion  du  ‘péché’  est  la  catégorie  du 
‘devant’ Dieu.” 
28. Civ. Dei XIX,  13  (CCSL 48,  p.  679):  “Ordo  est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca 
tribuens dispositio.” For this trans., see H. Bettenson, the City of God against the Pagans, p. 870 
(cf. n. 13). 
29. Cf. A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic, L’ordre  caché.  La  notion  d’ordre  chez  saint  Augustin  (Paris: 
Institut  d’Études  Augustiniennes,  2004),  p.  595,  who  oberves  that,  according  to  Augustine, 
“l’ordre est absolu, il ne peut qu’être respecté ou violé, voire même simplement ‘negligé.’” 
30. Civ. Dei XII,8 (CCSL 48, p. 362): “Deficitur enim non ad mala, sed male.” 
31. Cf. ibid., XIX,13, where Augustine notes that even the nature of Satan, qua natura, is good. 
32. J.-L. Marion, Au lieu de soi. L’approche de Saint Augustin (Paris: Puf, 2008), p. 178. The italics 
are Marion’s. 
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to mind: “We make an idol of truth itself, for truth apart from charity is not God, 
but his image and an idol that we must not love or worship. Still less must we 
love or worship its opposite, which is falsehood.”33 
Augustine sees this opposition between ontological order and ethical disorder 
as the root of all (other) differences between pietas and wickedness, truth and 
deception, conversio and aversion;34 in a word, it is between superbia and ordo 
amoris that the summary of the insuperable distance between the civitas born of 
the earth and the civitas that descends from heaven may be found. The former 
springs from a will to self-affirmation and feeds upon an equivocal religious 
idolatry. It is only at the service of an imperialistic model of power and, hence, is, 
like everything that is born and wears itself out on earth, destined to perish. The 
latter, by contrast, has an absolutely heteronomous genesis that confers on it the 
call to find its supreme fullness in communion with God and His people: 
“ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo.”35 
Thus we are led back to the heart of the design governing the entire concep-
tual and literary architecture of civ. Dei: the conflict between love of self and 
love of God makes it possible to recognize the very root of peace and violence 
on either the intrapersonal or interpersonal level. This is not by chance. Augus-
tine portrays the antithesis between the two cities by opposing Babylon, “quae 
appellata est  ‘Confusio,’”36 a disturbing and exemplary metaphor for superba 
impietas, and Jerusalem, in whom the nomen mysticum can be interpreted as 
visio pacis.37 The Platonic idea of a fundamental internal continuity between 
anthropology and politics finds here a new articulation: just as the very statute 
of the personal being is identified in the mystery of the Trinitarian communion, 
so too the human person reaches an authentic “de veritate gaudium”38 when his 
life achieves a triple equilibrium in his relationships on the interior, the 
exterior, and the superior levels. 
33. B. Pascal, Pensées, §581, trans. W. F. Trotter (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003), p. 161. 
Cf. also J.-L. Marion, Au lieu de soi, p. 190 (cf. n. 32). 
34. Cf. Augustine’s ep.140,23,56 (CSEL 44, p. 202): “Aversio eius, vitium eius et conversio virtus 
eius est.” Cf. also Ph. Curbelié, La justice dans la Cité de Dieu (Paris: Institut d’Études Augus-
tiniennes, 2004), pp. 240–241. 
35. Civ. Dei XIX,13 (cf. CCSL 48, p. 679). 
36. Ibid., XVI,4 (cf. CCSL 48, p. 504). 
37. Cf. ibid., XIX,11 (cf. CCSL 48, p. 675). 
38. Conf. X,xxiii,33 (CCSL 27, pp. 172–173). 
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“Non veritas, sed vanitas fecit” (civ. Dei I V ,21) 
In this context, the fundamental thematic unity of civ. Dei emerges clearly; 
indeed,  it  begins with Augustine’s  foundational  and opening  question,  one which 
actually parallels a question asked by the psalmist long ago: “Ubi est Deus tuus?”39 
The broad survey that is the first ten books thus tends not only to demonstrate the 
impossibility of giving a polytheistic response to such a question, but also to 
reconstruct the diabolic genesis of any such response. The distinction between the 
Books I–V and Books VI–X makes it possible to measure the impotence of the 
pagan divinities according to the dual earthly and heavenly parameters that have 
been woven throughout the entire work. And it is for this reason that the discourse 
of the second section deepens and a more articulated theological analysis is inserted 
in place of descriptions of pagan divinities. 
Thus, the entire structure of Augustine’s argument is sustained by the difference 
between error and deceit: the polytheistic cult is born not simply of error, having 
sought to hypostasize in mythological form the multiple attributes of God, but, in 
fact, is the fruit of a deliberate and systematic deception through which the fallen 
angels  protract  their  rebellion  against  God.  Drawing  upon  Eccl.  10:15,  “Initium 
quippe omnis peccati superbia,” Augustine sees the dividing line between the hap-
piness and unhappiness of the angels as precisely their union with or separation 
from the supreme being;40 and it is for this reason that the pagan cult is dominated 
by the sinister ethos of a tragic and desperate revolt. 
In this way, Augustine’s intent goes well beyond the realm of simple apologet-
ics. There has already been an abundance of sarcastic ridicule of the pagan cultus: it 
is theoretically unsupportable, morally indecent, and practically useless all at the 
same  time.  The  author’s  objective  is  far  more  ambitious:  Augustine  wants  to 
denounce the subtle iniquity of the evil spirits and warn his readers against their 
diabolic power. In fact, while humans have no vice so deep as to cause the total 
loss of their sense of honesty, the wickedness of the demons climaxes its perversity 
as they mask themselves as angels of the light (cf. 2 Cor. 11:14),41 thus eliminating 
all differences between sacred and sacrilege, between purification and 
39. Ps. 41:4. Cf. civ. Dei I,29 (cf. CCSL 47, p. 30). 
40. Civ. Dei XII,6 (CCSL 48, p. 359): “Proinde causa beatitudinis angelorum bonorum ea verissima 
reperitur, quod ei adhaerent qui summe est. Cum vero causa miseriae malorum angelorum qua-
eritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo, qui summe est, aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non 
summe sunt; et hoc vitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupetur?” 
41. Ibid., X,10 (CCSL 47, pp. 283–284). 
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profanation.42 Varro’s attempt to reserve for the elect gods the highest functions 
proper when applied only to the one true God was to no avail; it is from Him 
alone that eternal life is to be hoped for.43 Moreover, if the pagans wanted to 
adumbrate a plural articulation of the virtues, why deify only Virtue and Faith 
and ignore the others?44 Do those who adore Virtue and Happiness need further 
polytheistic  integrations?  Is  it  not  perhaps  true  that  “surely,  virtue  includes  all 
that ought to be done, felicity all that ought to be desired?”45 
The believer sins when he offers sacrifices due to the true God to some other 
element of the world or some created spirit. And when his sacrifices degenerate 
into vile and iniquitous practices, then “such a man commits a double sin against 
God; in the first place, he worships, in place of God, a being who is other than 
God; in the second place, his instruments of worship are such as should not be 
employed  in  the  worship  either  of  God  or  of  any  other  being.”46 This 
degeneration of the idolatrous cultus is the logical consequence of the vanities 
upon which it is founded, the convergence of the defective and nihilistic aspect 
that connotes the ontological fragility of every earthly absolute as well as of the 
abusive and dishonest aspect of the sin of pride.47 The absurd pretext of placing 
human creations before man in order to worship them inevitably translates into a 
distancing from God: “So  it  is  just  that man should be sundered from him who 
made him, when he puts above himself that which he has created.”48 All the 
pagan  gods,  in  fact,  “are  ‘sons  of  earth,’  and  so  earth  is  their  mother.  But 
according to the true theology, the earth is the work of God, not its mother.”49 
42. Ibid., II,4 (CCSL 47, p. 37): “Quae sunt sacrilegia, si illa sunt sacra? Aut quae inquinatio, si illa 
lavatio?” 
43. Cf. ibid., VII,30 (CCSL 47, p. 212). 
44. Cf. ibid., IV,20 (CCSL 47, p. 114). 
45. Ibid., IV,21 (CCSL 47, p. 114): “Omnia quippe agenda complectitur virtus; omnia optanda felici-
tas.” For this trans., see H. Bettenson, The City of God against the Pagans, p. 159 (cf. n. 13). 
46. Ibid., VII,27 (CCSL 47, p. 210): “Bis peccat in Deum, quod et pro ipso colit, quod non est ipse, 
et  talibus  rebus  colit,  qualibus  nec  ipse  colendus  est  nec  non  ipse.”  For  this  trans.,  see  H. 
Bettenson, The City of God against the Pagans, pp. 288–289 (cf. n. 13). 
47. The warning of vera rel. 38,69 (CCSL 32, p. 233) always seems to lurk in the background: 
“Itaque cum omnia temporalia mundus iste concludat, omnibus mundi partibus serviunt, qui 
propterea putant nihil colendum esse ne serviant.” 
48. Cf. civ. Dei VIII,23 (CCSL 47, p. 241): “Quapropter merito homo deficit ab illo qui eum fecit, 
cum sibi praeficit ipse quod fecit.” For this trans., see H. Bettenson, The City of God against the 
Pagans, p. 332 (cf. n. 13). 
49. Ibid. VI,8  (CCSL 47, p. 177): “Sic enim sunt  terrigenae, sic eis mater est  terra.  In vera autem 
theologia  opus  Dei  est  terra,  non  mater.”  For  this  trans., see H. Bettenson, The City of God 
against the Pagans, p. 242 (cf. n. 13). 
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Calling upon or otherwise worshiping them means rendering oneself a slave of 
demons, not of gods.50 
In an important passage in civ. Dei VIII, Augustine uses the words of Jeremiah 
(cf.16:20) in order to claim that a man cannot make gods for himself; in particular, 
he denounces several pernicious consequences of this vain and sinful attempt. First, 
making earthly idols is the same as subjecting oneself to a dangerous form of 
slavery, entering into relations with unclean spirits;51 for this reason, those who 
deplore the end of the cultus of idols actually desire to remain in a state of complete 
enslavement.52 Second, the act of binding oneself to earthly idols can only give rise 
to a closed society devoid of authentic universality: in fact, “the demon attached to 
an imagine by an impious art has been made a god by man, but a god for this 
particular kind of man, not for all mankind.” Augustine then goes on to ask: “What 
sort of a god then is this who could only be made by a man who is in error, who 
lacks faith, who is estranged from the true God?”53 
How can one be happy in a society desperately clinging to such ephemeral 
goods? In Book IV, the antithesis between the two cities is fully anticipated in the 
form of an irreducible opposition between felicitas and vanitas; it is one that can 
be seen on the personal, familial, social and political levels. Augustine associates 
with this not only the proclamation of Christian universalism, born of the 
awareness of humanity’s  common destiny,  fulfilled  in  the  incarnation of Christ, 
the unique authentic mediator and the only way of salvation for all men, but also 
an important corollary: adoring the true God and serving Him with authentic 
sacrifices and purity of habits brings about the regnum bonorum for the benefit of 
Christians and of all citizens of earth: 
And, in this world, the reign of the good is a blessing for themselves, and even 
more for the whole of human society. In contrast, the reign of the wicked is 
more harmful to those who wield the power, who bring destruction on their own 
soul through the greater scope thus given for their misdeeds, whereas those who 
are enslaved beneath them are harmed only by their own wickedness.54 
50. Cf. ibid. VII,14 (cf. CCSL 47, p. 198). 
51. Ibid. VIII,24 (CCSL 47, p. 244): “Sed immundi spiritus eisdem simulacris arte illa nefaria col-
ligati cultorum suorum animas in suam societatem redigendo miserabiliter captivaverant.” 
52. Cf. ibid. 
53. Ibid. VI,8 (CCSL 47, p. 245): “Daemon quippe simulacro arte impia colligatus ab homine factus 
est deus, sed tali homini, non omni homini. Qualis est ergo iste deus, quem non faceret homo 
nisi errans et  incredulus et aversus a vero Deo?” For this trans., see H. Bettenson, The City of 
God against the Pagans, p. 337 (cf. n. 13). 
54. Ibid. VI,3 (CCSL 47, p. 101): “In hac ergo terra regnum bonorum non tam illis praestatur quam 
rebus humanis; malorum vero regnum magis regnantibus nocet, qui suos animos vastant scelerum 
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At the same time, by linking the idolatrous perversion with an impious phenom-
enology of the libido dominandi and denouncing the inversion of freedom and slavery 
that is at the origin of the act that instituted the civitas terrena, Augustine rejects the 
fundamentalist and theocratic temptations that can arise from attributing any kind of 
salvific mission to politics.55 The civitas terrena, in fact, is founded on an equivocal 
mixture of religion and politics, inasmuch as its god does not precede the civitas; on 
the contrary, it is the civitas that comes first and creates its own gods.56 And, since the 
civitas claims to be ultimately self-legitimating, it manipulatively offers the pagan 
divinities a relativistic pantheon, in which the disintegrative drive of amor privatus is 
accentuated. For this reason, there can be no pax iustitiae, the only possible foundation 
for peaceful coexistence, if the social projection, however imperfect, of amor 
humanae laudis does not give way to dilectio iustitiae and to amor veritatis.57 
In contrast, the civitas Dei peregrina, inasmuch as it finds in the civitas Dei 
caelestis the foundation and salvific condition of its own being in itinere, avoids 
any political, cultural, or ethno-geographic identification: 
this Heavenly City, therefore, is in pilgrimage in this world, she calls out citizens 
from all nations and so collects a society of aliens, speaking all languages. She 
takes no account of any difference in customs, laws, and institutions, by which 
earthly peace is achieved and preserved—not that she annuls or abolishes any of 
those, rather, she maintains them and follows them (for whatever divergences 
there are among the diverse nations, those institutions have one single aim—
earthly peace), provided that no hindrance is presented thereby to the religion 
which teaches that the one supreme and true God is to be worshipped.58 
In this way, and for the sake of political coexistence, Augustine does not ex-
change the historical horizon, which is the place of the individual and collective 
maiore licentia; his autem, qui eis servendo subduntur,non nocet nisi propria iniquitas.” For this 
trans., see H. Bettenson, The City of God against the Pagans, p. 139 (cf. n. 13). 
55. Cf. J. B. Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of Politics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995), which underlines the Augustine’s distance from any kind of triumphalistic 
mythicizing of the state. 
56. This thesis is central to J. Ratzinger, Volk und haus Gottes in Augustins lehre von der Kirche 
(St. Ottilien: Eos, 1992). 
57. Cf. civ. Dei V,14 (cf. CCSL 47, p. 147). 
58. Ibid. XIX,17 (CCSL 48, p. 685): “Haec ergo caelestis civitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex om-
nibus gentibus cives evocat atque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem, non curans 
quidquid in moribus, legibus institutisque diversum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiritur vel 
tenetur, nihil eorum rescindens vel destruens, immo etiam servans ac sequens, quod licet 
diversum in diversis nationibus, ad unum tamen eumdemque finem terrenae pacis intenditur, si 
religionem, qua unus summus et verus Deus colendus docetur, non impedit.” For this trans., see 
H. Bettenson, the City of God against the Pagans, p. 878 (cf. n. 13). 
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manifestation of moral evil, with the ontological horizon, which at its root is marked 
by a creaturely positivity and by an inter-human solidarity that not even the first sin 
was able to destroy. In fact, “no creature’s perversion is so contrary to nature as to 
destroy the very last vestiges of its nature.”59 Thus, in the gap between the ontological 
positivity of created nature and the various forms of defectio in which the evil of 
history expresses itself, there exists a kind of point of intersection, albeit fragile and 
precious, in the good of peace—and the peace of the civitas in particular—inasmuch 
as it is an inalienable condition of an ordered coexistence. It is the point of arrival for 
the minimum historical aspiration of Babylon and, at the same time, the point of 
departure for the maximum eschatological  tension of Jerusalem: “All man’s use of 
temporal things is related to the enjoyment of earthly peace in the earthly city; 
whereas in the Heavenly City it is related to the enjoyment of eternal peace.”60 
Even the people that alienates itself from God, in fact, “loves a peace of its own, 
which is not to be rejected. . . . Meanwhile, however, it is important for us also that 
this people should possess this peace during in this life, since so long as the two 
cities are intermingled we also make use  of  the  peace  of  Babylon.”61 In peace, 
therefore, the bond of harmony inherent in love is built, albeit on different levels: 
temporal peace speaks the language of mutable sharing, but not of the full, 
indefectible possession possible only in eternal life. Thus, in history, Christians live 
a kind of paradoxical citizenship: by virtue of grace, they tend toward pax aeterna, 
but, by virtue of nature, they live in the pax terrena. For this reason they are called 
to embrace and promote the peace that, for the civitas terrena, is only a res; that is, 
they are also called to assign that peace a signum and to embrace the liberating value 
that it has for them. What distinguishes the Christians is not an exterior separateness, 
nor a theocratic claim to have “captured” coexistence. They share with everyone the 
harshness, the disorder and the injustice that reign in history, but they are called to 
the unheard of task of converting all of these things, so to speak, from within. “For 
they do not give orders because of a lust for domination but from a 
59. Ibid. XIX,12 (CCSL 48, pp. 677–678): “Nullius quippe vitium ita contra naturam est, ut naturae 
deleat etiam extrema vestigia.” For this trans., see H. Bettenson, the City of God against the Pa-
gans, p. 869 (cf. n. 13). 
60. Ibid.  XIX,14  (CCSL  48,  p.  680):  “Omnis  igitur  usus  rerum  temporalium  refertur  ad  fructum 
pacis terrenae in terrena civitate;  in caelesti autem civitate refertur ad fructum pacis aeternae.” 
For this trans., see H. Bettenson, The City of God against the Pagans, p. 872 (cf. n. 13). 
61. Ibid. XIX,26 (CCSL 48, pp. 696–697):  “Diligit  tamen  etiam  ipse  quamdam pacem  suam non 
improbandam, quam quidem non habebit in fine, quia non ea bene utitur ante finem. Hanc 
autem ut interim habeat in hac vita, etiam nostri interest; quoniam, quamdiu permixtae sunt 
ambae civitates, utimur et nos pace Babylonis.” For  this  trans.,  see H. Bettenson,  The City of 
God against the Pagans, p. 892 (cf. n. 13). 
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dutiful concern for the interests of others, not with pride in taking precedence over 
others, but with compassion in taking care of others.”62 In the final analysis, the two 
cities are marked by diversa fide, diversa spe, and diverso amore.63 
Book XIX’s splendid treatise on peace, therefore, is not a happy parenthesis that 
unexpectedly illuminates an unsystematic and disjointed narrative structure. Rather, 
it is the coherent intellectual harbor for the voyage that is this entire work. And it is 
in the light of this harbor that the interpretive theses with which I began should be 
re-examined. The impossibility of avoiding the dilemma between faith and idolatry 
confirms, first of all, the anthropologically inalienable statute of belief, which, in 
Augustine, goes hand-in-hand with the recognition of the anthropologically 
constitutive statute of the interpersonal relationship. This convergence makes it 
impossible to suspend the entire warp and woof of the life of relationships in some 
neutral limbo and it demonstrates how it, too, continually oscillates between civitas 
Dei and civitas diaboli. The possibility of this dual anchorage in heaven or on earth 
qualifies the very nature of the civitas, and does so at a level that precedes the 
genesis of the political institution and prevents the power that it represents from 
manipulating religious categories. 
In the second place, the nature and content of the Christian revelation includes 
and bears witness to an absolute irreducibility vis-à-vis the polytheistic pantheon, by 
which  Christianity  can  never  be  syncretistically  absorbed:  “[t]he  differentia in 
worship, latreia. The City of God cannot have ‘common laws of religion’ with the 
Earthly City.”64 This idea could also be expressed via the words of Benedict XVI, 
whose magisterium has been consistently characterized by this Augustinian per-
spective. He recently observed that “[t]his appeal to shun idols . . . is also pertinent 
today. Has not our modern world created its own idols? Has it not imitated, perhaps 
inadvertently, the pagans of antiquity, by diverting man from his true end, from the 
joy of  living eternally with God?”65 Consequently, the antithesis between the two 
cities, which incarnate two opposite modalities of living love, is insuperable in 
principle, even though belonging to one or the other is always historically open 
62. Ibid.  XIX,14  (CCSL  48,  p.  682):  “Neque  enim  dominandi  cupiditate  imperant,  sed  officio 
consulendi, nec principandi superbia, sed  providendi  misericordia.”  For  this  trans.,  see  H. 
Bettenson, The City of God against the Pagans, p. 874 (cf. n. 13). 
63. Ibid. XVIII,54 (CCSL 48, p. 656). 
64. E. TeSelle, “Justice, Love, Peace,” in Augustine Today, ed. R. J. Neuhaus (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1993), p. 95. 
65. Homily of His Holiness Benedict XVI, given in Paris at Notre-Dame, Esplanade des Invalides, on 
Saturday, September 13, 2008 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), http://www.vatican.va/holy 
_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2008/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20080913_parigi-esplanade 
_en.html (accessed June, 22, 2010). 
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and, until the last day, is a tension that tempts and interrogates the heart of man; 
until, that is, the lord of the harvest intervenes to separate definitively the wheat 
from the chaff.66 
Finally, a dual lesson can be drawn from this severe admonishment against 
idolatry: on the one hand, the will to disown determinism and polytheism on the 
dogmatic level is welded with the pastoral concern to keep Christianity from being 
contaminated by paganism. Refusing to channel into the Christian river the ancient 
ritual practices or to exploit expectations of miracles from them, Augustine warns 
against an unreflective return to superstitious practices within Christianity and en-
courages the constant purification of the Christian faith from idolatrous nostalgias of 
false intermediaries that are so often sought out in order to exorcise the anguish of 
dark times. On the other hand, reminding us that disorder, injustice and pride are the 
true enemies of peace and the things that poison the heart of man, he points out that 
the civitas Dei peregrina, in the eschatological dimension that constitutes it, re-
establishes the right rules for coexistence, inviting us to seek its transcendent 
foundation, since, in fact, this foundation is the only one able to keep man’s power 
over man from becoming a disastrous enslavement to one (or more) of several 
earthly absolutes. In the name of the concors communio that constitutes it, the 
civitas Dei peregrina offers precious antibodies against idolatries and introduces 
beneficial enzymes of virtuous sociality into the peace of Babylon. 
66. A beneficial conclusion that Augustine obviously gleaned from his difficult confrontations with 
Donatism. 
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